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Combating Fake News with
“Reasonable Standards”
By TAWANNA D. LEE, M.ED, J.D.*

Abstract
Fake news is an intractable concern around the globe, sowing division
and distrust in institutions, and undermining election integrity. This Article
analyzes the spectrum of private and public regulation of “fake news” from
comparative law and normative perspectives. In the United States,
combating fake news shares surprising bipartisan support in an ever-divided
political landscape. While several proposals have emerged that would strip
Internet media companies of the liability shield for third-party content, it is
unlikely that they would survive the seemingly insurmountable First
Amendment scrutiny. This Article argues for a different tact—an amendment
to the Communications Decency Act that addresses platform design choices
rather than speech. In doing so, the Article addresses constitutional
concerns of online expression and censorship and demonstrates that a
“reasonable standard” is consistent with the existing Internet regulatory
framework.

Introduction
In October 2019, Twitter, in addition to other tech platforms and media
outlets like YouTube, Facebook, MSNBC, and Fox, ran a 30-second
campaign ad that falsely accused Democratic presidential candidate Joe
Biden of blackmailing Ukrainian officials to stop an investigation of his son.1
The viral video was viewed more than 1.5 million times after President
Trump posted it to his Twitter account.2 With top performing fake stories
like this one reaching users, on average six times faster than content from

*

J.D., The George Washington University Law School, May 2020. Editor-in-Chief,
Vol. 72, Federal Communications Law Journal, Internet Law & Policy Foundry Fellow.
1. Emily Stewart, Facebook is refusing to take down a Trump ad making false claims about
Joe Biden, VOX (OCT. 9, 2019, 2:30 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/
2019/10/9/20906612/trump-campaign-ad-joe-biden-ukraine-facebook.
2. Eugene Kiely & Robert Farley, Fact: Trump TV Ad Misleads on Biden and Ukraine,
FACTCHECK.ORG (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.factcheck.org/2019/10/fact-trump-tv-ad-misleadson-biden-and-ukraine/.
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reputable news outlets,3 Internet media companies are powerful vectors for
the distribution and amplification of fake news.4
“Fake news” articles have existed for centuries. However, the Internet
has enabled them to spread at a rapid pace, with users consuming,
processing, and sharing them before anyone has considered their veracity.
This phenomenon is particularly pernicious with respect to political
information. A 2017 Yale Law School Information Society Project
identified that the primary tangible harm that results from fake news is that
it “devalues and delegitimizes voices of expertise, authoritative institutions,
and the concept of objective data—all of which undermines society’s ability
to engage in rational discourse based upon shared facts.”5 Consider one
estimate that suggests that “86% of the groups running paid ads on Facebook
in the last six weeks before the 2016 election were suspicious groups,
astroturf movement groups,6 and questionable news outlets.”7
To understand the scale of the problem, consider that a 2019 World
Economic Forum Global Risks report continued to call attention to “fake

3. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2019: 14TH EDITION (2019), http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf.
4. Merriam-Webster defines misinformation as “incorrect or misleading information,”
whereas disinformation is distinguished as false information deliberately and often covertly spread
(as by the planting of rumors) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth.” Compare
misinformation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/misinformation (last visited Apr. 29, 2020), with disinformation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disinformation (last visited
Apr. 29, 2020). Colloquially, misinformation is understood as merely misleading whereas
disinformation is understood as an outright falsehood. As a result, the Article, as do the sources
cited, uses the terms interchangeably. Where possible, the article refers simply to “fake news.”
It is important to note that “fake news” falls on a spectrum, measured by intent to deceive. The
spectrum ranges from satire or parody misleading content on one end of the spectrum, to imposter
and fabricated content in the mid-range, followed by false connection, where the imagery, captions,
or headlines do not support the content, and false context and manipulated content. See Claire
Wardle, Fake News. It’s Complicated, FIRST DRAFT NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://medium.com/
1st- draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79.
5. THE INFO. SOC’Y PROJECT & THE FLOYD ABRAMS INST. FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
FIGHTING FAKE NEWS WORKSHOP REPORT, (Mar. 7, 2017), available at https://law.yale.edu/
sites/default/files/area/center/isp/documents/fighting_fake_news_-_workshop_report.pdf.
6. Merriam-Webster defines astroturfing as “organized activity that is intended to create a
false impression of a widespread, spontaneously arising, grassroots movement in support of or in
opposition to something (such as a political policy) but that is in reality initiated and controlled by
a concealed group or organization (such as a corporation).” Astroturfing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/astroturfing (last visited Apr.
29, 2020).
7. Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating Fake News and Other
Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1230 (2018), https://southerncalifornialawreview.
com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/91_6_1223.pdf. Existing campaign finance laws target paid
advertising, which does not reflect the totality of fake news in the Internet media ecosystem.
However, as the authors note, there is spending that occurs in various stages of a disinformation
campaign, including salary and production that may trigger existing rules.
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news” as a leading global risk.8 This risk assessment reflects a deeper
concern that the prevalence of “fake news” has increased political
polarization, decreased trust in public institutions, and undermined
democracy.9 These phenomena complicate the means by which our political
system operates and the manner in which people hold political leaders
accountable. In an Internet media ecosystem, which exposed Americans to
more “fake news” than accurate political information during the 2016 U.S.
election cycle,10 the economics of generating clicks and views of sensational
or novel headlines over those that are newsworthy underscores the threat to
democracy in failing to moderate fake news.11
In fact, Internet media companies’ rational self interest lies in exploiting
this phenomenon, increasing advertising revenue by promoting content that
drives users to like, click, and share.12 For instance, during the 2016 election,
fake news websites created by profit driven Macedonian teenagers indicated
that the linchpin of their business model was to drive content to social media
platforms.13 While likely not the sole motive for trafficking in “fake news,”
the profit margin should not be understated. As a case in point, a New York
Times exclusive story about Donald Trump’s purported $916 million loss on
his 1995 income tax returns generated a paltry 175,000 Facebook
interactions over a month compared to a “fake news” headline from
ConservativeState.com, which garnered 480,000 interactions in just one
week.14 But how does the government address the issue of fake news in a
manner that does not circumscribe protected speech?
This Article seeks to analyze the spectrum of private and public
regulation of disinformation in online political speech, hereinafter referred
to as “fake news,” from comparative law and normative perspectives. This
Article then proposes an amendment to Section 230 of the Communications

8. Id.
9. See Darrell M. West, How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation, BROOKINGS (Dec.
18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/.
10. See e.g., Philip Howard & Bence Kolanyi, Social Media Companies Must Respond to the
Sinister Reality Behind Fake News, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2017, 7:03 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/media/2017/sep/30/social-media-companies-fake-news-us-election (discussing
the unequal distribution of fake news across the country during the 2016 election).
11. See generally Alice Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation And
Disinformation Online, DATA & SOC’Y, https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Data
AndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline-1.pdf.
12. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet As
It Is (And As It Should Be) MICH. L. REV. 1073, (2020), https://repository.law.umich.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5820&context=mlr.
13. Craig Silverman & Lawrence Alexander, How Teens In the Balkans Are Duping Trump
Supporters With Fake News, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM EST), https://www.
buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/how-macedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-trump-misinfo?utm_
term=.eaD8L1pQO#.se1x-j35mJ.
14. Id.
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Decency Act requiring platforms to adopt “reasonable standards” in order to
retain their shield of immunity.
In addressing this issue, Part I will consider the impact of the spread of
fake news on the Internet versus fake news consumption of political
information via traditional media. Moreover, Part I will review the selfregulatory scheme and its role in the dissemination and amplification of fake
news in online political speech. As Part I will illustrate, the tension between
industry self-interest and the public interest have necessitated a
reexamination of the existing legal framework.
Part II will then provide a comparative overview of the public
regulation of online political speech in the European Union and address
concerns of censorship and limiting freedom of expression. While many of
the legal strategies deployed in the E.U. would be incompatible with the First
Amendment, this section will argue that the Internet media companies’
response to these initiatives demonstrate (1) a technological capacity to
address “fake speech” in more direct ways than currently exist for the U.S.
versions of their platforms; (2) an ability to engage third-party organizations
in making determinations about what constitutes “fake news;” and (3) the
need for regulation to modify platform behavior to align it in the public
interest.
Part III will discuss recent attempts to address the regulation of fake
news in online political speech. In particular, this part will consider proposed
federal legislation, subsequently enacted state legislation, and resulting the
judicial determinations about the constitutionality of attempts to regulate
political speech.
Finally, Part IV offers a recommendation to apply a legislative
framework tailored for the Internet ecosystem that would provide guard rails
against political “fake news” while respecting constitutional limitations on
regulating speech. Specifically, the Article proposes an amendment to
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, by carving out
“reasonable standards” safe harbors under which Internet media companies
may maintain the statutory immunity they enjoy for content posted by third
parties.

Current State of Online Political Speech in the U.S.
Self-Interest and Self-Regulation Come to a
Head in the Face of “Fake News”
What is fake news? NPR political reporter, Danielle Kurtzleben, notes
that while contemporary political figures have co-opted the term “fake news”
to devalue unfavorable news, fake news has traditionally referred to “lies
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posing as news.”15 Fake news, in the traditional sense, is “a media product
fabricated and disguised to look like credible news that is posted online and
circulated via social media.”16 Either of these “strategic uses of “fake
news”—to achieve specific political results and to destabilize the press as an
institution—are self-evidently very dangerous for democracy.”17
Traditional media arguably “expose[s] people to a range of topics and
views at the same time that they provide shared experiences for a
heterogeneous public.”18 Conversely, Internet media companies provide
platforms that leverage technology to “infiltrate a population of unaware
humans and manipulate them to affect their perception of reality, with
unpredictable results.”19 “[F]actual knowledge about politics is a critical
component of citizenship, one that is essential if citizens are to discern their
real interests. . . . In the absence of adequate information neither passion nor
reason is likely to lead to decisions that reflect the real interests of the
public.”20 The erosion of public trust in traditional news sources creates a
vacuum filled by misinformation. Regulating “fake news” in online political
speech in the context of an election is critical to protecting the rationality of
electoral outcomes.
As researchers Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis note, the spread of
misinformation leads to decreased trust in media, the impact of which
“weakens the political knowledge of citizens, inhibits its watchdog function,
and may impede the full exercise of democracy.”21 This phenomenon is
exacerbated by social and political divisions that undermine the traditional
ways in which truth ordinarily prevails. “Investigations, exposés, and studies
fall short in a situation where a significant portion of the population distrusts
a wide array of sources they perceive as politically or ideologically hostile

15. See Danielle Kurtzleben, With ‘Fake News,’ Trump Moves from Alternative Facts to
Alternative Language, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 17, 2017) (discussing the partisan polarization in
political discourse with the emergence of two separate views of fake news, first used to describe
the intentional dissemination of fictional news, and later morphing, ironically, into disinformation,
being adopted to discredit accurate but unfavorable news), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/17
/515630467/with-fake-news-trump-moves-from-altemative-facts-to-alternative-language.
16. Nina I. Brown & Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government Regulation and
Control of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 521-22 (2018), https://heinonline.org/
HOL/P?h=hein.journals/syrlr68&i=557. Notably, this definition excludes unintentional reporting
mistakes, conspiracy theories, satire that is unlikely to be misconstrued as factual, false statements
by politicians, and reports that are slanted but not outright false.
17. Lili Levi, Real Fake News and Fake Fake News, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 234-35
(2018), https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1580&context=fac_articles.
18. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
43 (2018).
19. West, supra note 9.
20. MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 3, 5 (1996).
21. Marwick, supra note 11 at 45.
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— including sources that traditionally commanded broad if not universal
respect.”22
Constitutional Protection
The First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act stand as
bulwarks to regulating online political speech. The First Amendment
provides that “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of
speech; or the press.”23 Moreover, “the First Amendment has its fullest and
most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.”24 The online dissemination of political opinions and information are
incontrovertibly political speech and is therefore protected by the First
Amendment. Under the strong protections afforded to political speech,
several legislative attempts to regulate in this space have been defeated.25
For example, in Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2019),
the court found
The lodestar for the First Amendment is the preservation of the
marketplace of ideas. When the government seeks to favor or
disfavor [political speech] . . . it compromises the integrity of our
national discourse and risks bringing about a form of soft
censorship. For this reason, content-based laws are “presumptively
unconstitutional,” the presumption being necessary to ensure that
the marketplace of ideas does not deteriorate into a forum for the
subjects of state-favored speech. . . . Because our democracy relies
on free debate as the vehicle of dispute and the engine of electoral
change, political speech occupies a distinctive place in First
Amendment law.26
Regulation of political speech “trenches upon an area in which the
importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith.”27 Buttressing
such strong protections of political speech—and hampering regulation on

22. Suzanne Nossel, The Pro-Free Speech Way to Fight Fake News, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct.
12, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/12/the-pro-free-speech-way-to-fight-fakenews/.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Eu v. S.F. City.
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, (1989)) (internal quotation omitted).
25. See id. at 510 (invalidating Maryland’s SB875, Online Electioneering Transparency and
Accountability Act).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 514 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988)) (internal quotations
omitted).
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“fake news”—the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, extended full free
speech protection to a knowing and intentional falsehood.28
While content-based laws—those that “target speech based on its
communicative content . . . may be justified only if the government proves
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests,”29 the
Court has recognized a compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the
electoral process; however, it has stopped short of extending that to
preventing fraud on the electorate.30 Absent reliable data demonstrating that
false speech has significantly undermined the electoral process, however, it
is unlikely that a court would find that this prong had been satisfied.
Notwithstanding the difficulty in demonstrating significant harm, it is
dubious that compelling Internet media companies to curb fake news is the
least restrictive means of achieving that interest.
Federal Legislation
The Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), referred to in the industry
simply as Section 230, was borne from concerns of defamation and
indecency liability to address “the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to
freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”31 Touted
as “the law that gave us modern Internet,”32 Section 230 provides statutory
immunity to online platforms from treatment as a publisher or speaker. The
argument for this shield was a recognition that if Internet media companies
could be liable for all user-generated content that they moderated, they
wouldn’t moderate anything at all.33

28. U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721-22 (2012) (“This opinion . . . . rejects the notion that
false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected.”). In Alvarez, the
false speech at issue was Alvarez’s misrepresentation that he had won the Congressional Medal of
Honor.
29. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 395 (1992)).
30. Compare Eu v. S.F. City. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989) (“A State
indisputably has compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”), with
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995) (“Ohio’s informational interest is
plainly insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure requirement.”).
31. 129 F.3d 327, 328, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). While the indecency prong was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the defamation prong has become a lynchpin of the Internet
ecosystem. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (striking down indecency prong).
32. Derek Khanna, The Law that Gave Us the Modern Internet –and the Campaign to Kill It,
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/the-lawthat-gave-us-the-modern-internet-and-the-campaign-to-kill-it/279588/.
33. Matt Laslo, The Fight Over Section 230—and the Internet as We Know It, WIRED (Aug.
13, 2019, 3:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-section-230-internet-as-we-know-it/.
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Following judicial decisions holding online providers liable for user
content.34 In Zeran v. America Online, the court opined that the specter of
strict liability normally applied to publishers might chill the free flow of
information.35 In response, it offered protection for “good Samaritan”
blocking and screening of offensive material to encourage service providers
to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their services.36
As Senator Ron Wyden, a drafter of the CDA, notes, this ensured “that
companies in return for that protection—that they wouldn’t be sued
indiscriminately—were being responsible in terms of policing their
platforms.”37
Specifically, Section 230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider.”38 An
interactive service provider is defined as “any information service, system,
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server.”39 This shield extends to Internet media
companies the relief that their offline counterparts—bookstores, newsstands,
libraries, and other “distributors”—receive under common law.40
However, broad judicial interpretation of Section 230 has provided
immunity for conduct far beyond, and likely in direct conflict with, that
which was contemplated by the CDA’s drafters who wanted to incentivize
platforms to clean up the Internet.41 As Professor Tushnet opines, “[o]ne
way to explain §230 is that it was enacted in the hope that ISPs would shut
down speech that Congress couldn’t constitutionally ban. From this
perspective, § 230 largely backfired.”42 Section 230 has offered platforms

34. See e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup .Ct.
May 24, 1995) (holding that the defendant’s message board was akin to a newspaper, and as such,
by taking steps to police the content of this message board, the defendant engaged in an editorial
function that exposed it to publisher liability).
35. Zeran, 129 F.3d 327 at 330 (“the amount of information communicated via interactive
computer services is . . . staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech
would have an obviously chilling effect.”).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018).
37.
Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google Is About to
Change, NPR (Mar. 21, 2018) (quoting Wyden), http://www.wbur.org/npr/591622450/section230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2018).
40. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). Immunity extended to interactive service providers is far
from unconditional. The statute provides for exceptions for criminal activity, IP infringement, and
privacy, among others. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2018).
41. Selukh, supra note 37.
42. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1008 n. 96 (2008), https://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/08/76-4-Tushnet.pdf.
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“power without responsibility,”43 shielding sites that host revenge porn,44
child predation,45 housing discrimination,46 and online sex trafficking.47
Internet Media Companies are the Appropriate Vehicles for Regulation
As a result of these two forces, Internet media companies rely on selfregulatory exercises to address “fake news” with respect to political speech.
Notwithstanding a shield of immunity against liability for third-party
content, Internet media companies engage in a great deal of moderation—
shadow banning, blocking, filtering—when it proves bad for business.48 The
lack of government regulation in this space has resulted in a patchwork of
content moderation practices that has garnered the attention—and
frustration—of federal legislators.49
Coordinated regulation is the appropriate response to the evolving
media landscape wherein exists a conflict of self-interest, and where political
vulnerability renders the current self-regulatory approach inapt.50
Cooperation between public and private entities is a necessary part of 21st
century Internet regulation. Internet media companies are best positioned to
mitigate harm because of their expertise on the issues that arise on their
platforms and the technical requirements necessary to address them, whereas
government regulation is required to provide accountability and an
enforcement mechanism.51 Government coordination provides several
important functions, including coordination facilitation, signaling to actors,
behavior modification, and value setting.52
43. Id.
44. See e.g., Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 158 (Tex. App. 2016).
45. See e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 600
(2008); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007), judgment summarily aff’d,
551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008).
46. See e.g., Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008); Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
47. See e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Recognizing that
judicial interpretation had stretched liability protection beyond its original intent, Congress cabined
Section 230’s immunity with the passage of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA)/ Allow
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) legislation. The controversial
amendment provided a carve out in immunity from federal civil and state criminal liability for
services that “promote and facilitate prostitution.”
48. See e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, 229 (2014)
(discussing how Facebook changed its position on pro rape pages after fifteen companies threatened
to pull their ads).
49. Laslo, supra note 32; Casey Newton, Everything You Need to Know About Section 230,
THE VERGE (Mar. 3, 2020, 9:20 AM EST), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/3/21144678/section230-explained-internet-speech-law-definition-guide-free-moderation.
50. Wood, supra note 7.
51. Wood, supra note 7.
52. Id at 1244.
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Technology companies, including Facebook, have signaled their
support for modernizing the law to hold Internet media companies
accountable for behavior on their platforms53 and more recently the
platforms have been more amenable to a new regulatory framework.54

The U.S. Regulatory Scheme: Industry Self-Regulation of
“Fake News” in Online Political Speech
Benefits of Self-Regulation
According to proponents, “the benefits of industry self-regulation are
apparent: speed, flexibility, sensitivity to market circumstances and lower
costs.”55 Moreover, when standard setting is executed by industry insiders
with deep subject-matter expertise, the resulting standards are arguably more
practicable and more effectively policed.56 Proponents also maintain that
industry accountability raises standards of behavior through a combination
of peer pressure and an internalized sense of responsibility. This elevated
standard of behavior is perhaps evident in the Internet Media companies’
response to the global pandemic of COVID-19.57
It is notable, however, that the Internet media ecosystem appears
divorced from a typical industry self-regulation model wherein there is “an
industry-level organization that regulates its members by setting rules and
standards about how they should conduct their business.”58 Instead,
individual companies have scrambled to provide the appropriate regulatory
scaffolding—and stave off regulation.

53. See Mark Zuckerberg, Mark Zuckerberg: The Internet needs new rules. Let’s start in
these four areas, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019, 3:00 p.m. EDT), (“I believe we need a more active
role for governments and regulators. By updating the rules for the Internet, we can preserve what’s
best about it—the freedom for people to express themselves and for entrepreneurs to build new
things—while also protecting society from broader harms.”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/
9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.htm.
54. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg released a white paper detailing potential regulation
and its impact on platform content moderation. See Monika Bickert. Charting A Way Forward:
Online Content Regulation, FACEBOOK (Mar. 2020), https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/
2020/02/Charting-A-Way-Forward_Online-Content-Regulation-White-Paper-1.pdf.
55. Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective,
19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 366 (1997).
56. See id.
57. Internet media companies quickly developed strategies to provide their users with
authoritative information on the virus, employed tools to combat misinformation, and provided data
for research. See e.g., Jonathan Shieber, Zuckerberg details the ways Facebook and Chan
Zuckerberg Initiative are responding to COVID-19, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 3, 2020, 8:20 PM PST),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/03/zuckerberg-details-the-ways-facebook-and-chan-zuckerberginitiative-are-responding-to-covid-19/.
58. Wood, supra note 7.
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The Dark Side of Self-Regulation
In practice, self-regulation often faces backlash for its perceived selfinterested behavior. Cynics decry self-regulation as a façade by which
industry “give[s] the appearance of regulation thereby warding off more
direct and effective government intervention while serving private interests
at the expense of the public.”59
Critics admonish that self-regulatory standards are usually lax and
enforcement is ineffective.60 Detractors also note that absent from selfregulation are many of the virtues of conventional public regulation, namely,
“visibility, credibility, accountability, compulsory application to all[,] . . .
greater likelihood of rigorous standards being developed, cost spreading, . . .
and availability of a range of sanctions.”61
Left to their own devices, concern has arisen that content moderation
strategies adopted by Internet media companies may not comport with
customary First Amendment norms and doctrine. As legal scholars
highlight, Internet media companies “lack a coherent theory of the First
Amendment.”62 Platforms are not “merely venues for debates in the
marketplace of ideas,” neither are they “exclusively supportive of speakers’
personal autonomy,” nor have they “taken a [] deliberation-enhancing
approach to speech . . . [that] should promote political engagement and
public discourse.”63 Instead, the largest players in the Internet media
landscape have camped out in their respective corners, leaving the field an
“inconsistent amalgam” of these values.64
Writ large, there is reason to be concerned with putting speech
regulation wholly in the hands of private corporations. As Verge tech
reporter Casey Newton points out, “[i]f you don’t want the state making calls
on political speech, you probably don’t want a quasi-state with 2.1 billion
daily users making calls on political speech, either.”65
U.S. Social Media Self-Regulation—Case Study: Drunk Nancy Pelosi
A recent fake news story circulating in U.S. news aptly illustrates the
dissemination and amplification of fake news at a scale impossible via
59. Gunningham, supra note 55 at 369-70.
60. See id. at 370.
61. Id.
62. Wood, supra note 7.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Casey Newton, Why Facebook can’t stop politicians from lying, THE VERGE (Oct. 9,
2019 6:00 AM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/10/9/20904516/facebook-politi
cal-ad-lies-regulation.

5/26/21

92

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

43:1

traditional media. The online sphere is the critical factor because of the
speed, anonymity, and volume of content it allows. On Wednesday, May
23, 2019, an altered video that made it appear that House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi was drunk began to circulate broadly across social media platforms.66
On Thursday evening, following a Fox Business news segment in which
panelists speculated about the House Speaker’s health and fitness for office,
President Donald Trump himself tweeted and then pinned to his profile
another manipulated video of the House Speaker to his estimated 60 million
Twitter followers.67 The altered video with the caption, “PELOSI
STAMMERS THROUGH NEWS CONFERENCE” was slowed down to
make her voice sound sluggish and her words appear slurred.68 The
combination of the two videos and speculation about the Speaker’s health
quickly gained attention. National media outlets immediately published
critical responses about the particular brand of misinformation at play, a
“shallow fake,” and called for Internet media companies to take action.69
The incident illustrates not only the role that online media companies
can play in amplifying “fake news” but the way in which such “fake news”
can make its way into mainstream news discourse. Internet media companies
engage in varying degrees of regulating online political speech through their
community standards and terms of service. Google’s YouTube took swift
action to remove the video.70 However, Facebook’s community standards
do not require that information posted on the platform is true.71 Instead, its
policy at the time that the video was posted was to refer it to third-party fact
checkers for review.72 The third-party fact checkers rated the video as false,
and in accordance with the social media platform’s policy, downgraded the
video’s distribution and provided additional context where it appeared in

66. Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk, Spread Across
Social Media, WASH. POST (May 24, 2019, 4:41 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunk-spread-across-socialmedia/.
67. Donald J. Trump (@realDonald Trump), TWITTER (May 23, 2019, 6:09 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1131728912835383300; see also Emily Stewart, What’s Up
With Twitter’s Follower Counts, Explained for Everyone — Including Trump, VOX (Apr. 24, 2019,
5:10 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/24/18514772/twitter-trump-followers-meeting-jackdorsey.
68. Id.
69. “Shallow fake” is a term used to describe the traditional-alteration and selective editing
of video and imagery. See Kalev Leetaru, The Real Danger Today is Shallow Fakes and Selective
Editing Not Deep Fakes, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2019, 1:11 PM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kalevleetaru/2019/08/26/the-real-danger-today-is-shallow-fakes-and-selective-editing-not-deepfakes/#607cae1f4ea0.
70. Donnie O’Sullivan, Doctored Videos Shared to Make Pelosi Sound Drunk Viewed
Millions of Times On Social Media, CNN (May 24 2019, 12:31 PM), https://www.cnn.
com/2019/05/23/politics/doctored-video-pelosi/index.html.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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users’ news feeds.73 Nonetheless, one version of the video had 2.5 million
views on its platform in just 12 hours after the video was posted.74
Internet Media Companies’ Varied Approaches to Self-Regulation in the
U.S.
On one end of the spectrum, Twitter announced an outright ban on
political advertising on its platform.75 Twitter CEO, Jack Dorsey recognizes
the shift that the Internet presents in the ways that political information is
consumed. Dorsey explained in a tweet that “Internet political ads present
entirely new challenges to civic discourse—machine-learning-based
optimization of messaging and microtargeting, unchecked misleading
information and deep fakes, all at increasing velocity, sophistication and
overwhelming scale.”76 Though the move was largely viewed as symbolic,77
it sets the social media platform apart in the Internet media ecosystem. With
digital advertising costing a fraction of traditional television advertising,
observers decry the move as disadvantaging challengers while supporting
entrenched candidates.78 In May 2020, Twitter took further action and began
applying a new label to tweets that contain potentially misleading
information about voting processes.79 For example, a new label prompting
Twitter users to “Get the facts about mail-in ballots” accompanied a set of
tweets in which the president railed against mail-in voting methods as
“fraudulent”80
Following Twitter’s announcement of its ban on political
advertisements, Google, announced an update to its political advertising
policy, with the goals to “protect campaigns, surface authoritative election
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Kate Conger, Twitter Will Ban All Political Ads, C.E.O. Jack Dorsey Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/twitter-political-ads-ban.html.
76. Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://twitter.com/
jack/status/1189634369016586240.
77. It should be noted that Twitter’s political advertising comprised a small fraction of its
advertising business. Moreover, the free exposure that the platform provides politicians more than
accounts for any loss in advertising opportunity. For example, according to The Guardian’s
Shannon McGregor, 80% of President Trump’s tweets make their way into mainstream media,
garnering media exposure. That exposure was valued at an estimated $2bn during the 2016 election
cycle. See generally Shannon C. McGregor, Why Twitter’s Ban on Political Ads Isn’t As Good As
it Sounds, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2019, 6:00 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2019/nov/04/twitters-political-ads-ban.
78. McGregor, supra, note 76.
79. See Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles, Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information,
TWITTER: BLOG (May 11, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-ourapproach-to-misleading-information.html.
80. Makena Kelly, Twitter Labels Trump Tweets As ‘Potentially Misleading’ for the First
Time, THE VERGE (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:04 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2020/
5/26/21271207/twitter-donald-trump-fact-check-mail-in-voting-coronavirus-pandemic-california.

5/26/21

94

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

43:1

news, and protect elections from foreign interference.”81 Attempting to align
itself with traditional media outlets, such as TV, radio, and print, Google has
prohibited political campaigns from engaging in microtargeting, an
advertising technique that uses consumer data, online behavior, and
demographics to tailor messaging.82 Microtargeting has been viewed as “the
online equivalent of whispering millions of different messages into zillions
of different ears for maximum effect and with minimum scrutiny.”83 In
particular, political campaigns are no longer permitted to target “affinity
audiences” or “remarket,”—serve ads to people who’ve previously taken an
action, for instance visiting a campaign’s website.84 Striking at the heart of
the problem of fake news, advertisements with “demonstrably false claims
that could significantly undermine participation or trust” in elections are now
banned.85
On the other end of the spectrum, Facebook has made the controversial
decision to continue to allow political “fake news” to propagate across its
platform. Instead, Facebook’s policy is merely to provide additional context,
by way of “related news” links appearing next to “fake news.” By late July
2020 pressure on Internet media companies to label potentially misleading
information led Facebook to adopt what critics decry as a half-measure. The
platform implemented a new policy to add a link to official voting
information to any post about voting, whether the post is John Q. Citizen or
a political candidate and regardless of whether the content is accurate.86
Facebook’s stance on not fact checking advertisements from politicians can
be explained, at least in part, by what Professor Philip Napoli identifies as “a
First Amendment tradition that has valorized the notion of
counter[]speech.”87
Facebook’s community standards prohibit “misinformation” defined as
“ads that include claims debunked by third-party fact checkers or, in certain
circumstances, claims debunked by organizations with particular
81. Scott Spencer, An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD (Nov.
20, 2019), https://www.blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-ads-policy/.
82. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Shane Goldmacher, Google Policy Change Upends Online
Plans for 2020 Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
11/20/technology/google-political-ads-targeting.html.
83. Kara Swisher, Google Changed Its Political Ad Policy. Will Facebook Be Next?, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/opinion/google-political-ads.html.
84. Id.
85. Spencer, supra, note 81.
86. Shirin Ghaffary, Facebook’s New Label on a Trump Post Is an “Abject Failure,” Says a
Biden Campaign Spokesperson, VOX (July 21, 2020, 7:12 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/
recode/2020/7/21/21333001/facebook-label-trump-fact-check-biden-democrats-republicans-2020
-elections-policy.
87. Phillip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment
Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 58 (2018) (internal
quotations omitted); see e.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727 (“The remedy for speech that is false is
speech that is true.”).
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expertise.”88 While paid political advertising must conform to the platform’s
community standards, Facebook VP of Global Affairs and Communications,
Nick Clegg, clarified that most political advertisements would be exempt
from the platform’s fact-checking.89 The platform has not addressed the hotbutton issue of microtargeting. Political strategists highlight Facebook’s
desire to walk the fine line between moderating content and alienating
groups who leverage the platform’s access to an estimated 70% of American
adults90 in their campaign fundraising efforts.
Facebook’s practices allow it to adopt an approach that, on the one
hand, espouses transparency whereby political advertisements are available
to the public so that researchers, journalists, and John Q. Citizen can
investigate the content of those ads themselves, while on the other hand
continuing to advance a business model predicated on generating advertising
revenue by exerting near-total control of users’ online experience.91
Legislators have cautioned that Internet media companies are abusing
the immunity extended to them by the Communications Decency Act.92
Some have indicated that removal of such immunity is not out of the
question, and were Congress to act, it would end the self-regulation regime
in the U.S., moving things more in line with the E.U. model.93

Current State of Online Political Speech in the E.U.
The Action Plan against Disinformation
The model for combating fake news in the European Union stands in
direct contrast to the self-regulatory framework of the U.S. Europe has
traditionally favored regulation over freedom of expression. Identifying fake
news as a “threat to democratic political and policy-making processes,” the
European Union has a adopted a public governance approach combating it.
While incompatible with the First Amendment, a comparative overview of
88. Advertising Policies, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads (last visited
July 7, 2020).
89. Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Sept. 24, 2019,
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/ (“We don’t believe [ ] that it’s
an appropriate role for us to referee political debates and prevent a politician’s speech from reaching
its audience and being subject to public debate and scrutiny.”).
90. John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 16,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/.
91. Mike Isaac, Why Everyone is Angry at Facebook Over its Political Ads Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/technology/campaigns-pressure-face
book-political-ads.html.
92. See Recode Decode, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi Says Tech Immunity “Could Be
in Jeopardy”, VOX (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.vox.com/podcasts/2019/4/11/18306834/nancypelosi-speaker-house-tech-regulation-antitrust-230-immunity-kara-swisher-decode-podcast.
93. Id.
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public regulation of online political speech in the European Union highlights
three phenomena: (1) a technological capacity to address “fake speech” in
more direct ways, (2) a workable framework for engaging third-party
organizations so as to avoid being “arbiters of truth,” and (3) the need for
regulation to modify platform behavior for the public good.
Since 2015, following a decision of the European Counsel in response
to Russian disinformation campaigns, the E.U. has been actively regulating
disinformation,94 defined as “verifiably false or misleading information
created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally
deceive the public.”95 In 2018, the European Commission took additional
steps to crack down on “fake news,” adopting The Action Plan against
Disinformation (“The Plan”).96 The first prong of The Plan focuses on
improving detection of disinformation, through investment in additional
staff, data analysis tools, and public education efforts.97 In the second prong
of the plan, the E.U. implemented a coordinated alert system among E.U.
institutions and member states to respond to disinformation threats in real
time.98 With respect to U.S. efforts, the third prong of the approach is
noteworthy. The third prong of the approach included the adoption of a selfregulatory Code of Practice on Disinformation as a component of its Action
Plan against Disinformation. Among seven European trade associations,
U.S. signatories to the Code of Practice include Internet media companies
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, and Twitter.99 The Code of Practice
seeks to ensure transparency in political advertising, the shuttering of fake
accounts, identifying non-human interactions, and cooperating with factcheckers to detect disinformation and widely promote fact-checked
content.100 Each signatory presented detailed roadmaps highlighting the
tools to be deployed against fake news.101

E.U. Public Regulation of Fake News in Online Political Speech
Transparency, accountability, and consumer protection are often touted
benefits of public regulation. Detractors argue that federal regulation may
94. Press Release IP/18/6647, European Commission , A Europe that Protects: The EU Steps
Up Action Against Disinformation (Dec. 5, 2018).
95. European Commission, Policy on Tackling Online Disinformation, https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinformation (July 7, 2020).
96. Press Release, supra, note 93.
97. Id.
98.
Press Release STATEMENT/19/6166, European Commission, Code of Practice on
Disinformation One Year on: Online Platforms Submit Self-Assessment Reports (Oct. 29, 2019).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. European Commission, News article on Roadmaps to Implement the Code of Practice on
Disinformation, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/roadmaps-implement-code-pra
ctice-disinformation (July 7, 2020).
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be excessively burdensome. Researchers point to three phenomena that
undermine the utility of public regulation. “First, agencies intermittently
overreact to crises, and years, if not decades, may pass before guidelines
developed in the aftermath of crises are corrected. Second, government
agencies are not liable for inefficient rules, undermining the financial
accountability necessary to incentivize efficient rulemaking and thereby
potentially promoting over-regulation.”102 The pace of industry transition
exacerbates the shortcomings of general agency regulation with rapid
technological evolution outpacing government regulation. This is evident in
the conversation on the Hill with respect to modernizing the twenty-four year
old Communications Decency Act that was penned almost a decade before
Facebook, was founded.
Other detractors condemn government regulation as exceedingly
flexible and under-enforced for a myriad of reasons: lack of resources,
insular perspectives of government, self-serving administrators, or
regulatory capture.103 Moreover, changes between administrations may lead
to vacillation between standards. 104 The revolving door between political
appointments and private sector executive suites may also foster a climate
whereby administrators may seek to improve their prospects in industry by
advancing the agenda of interest groups that desire loose policies.105
E.U Social Media Public Regulation – Case Study: Maria and the Mafia
In November 2017, in the weeks before Italy’s national election,
photographs began to circulate that purported to show Maria Elena Boschi,
a prominent lawmaker and member of former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s
ruling Democratic Party, at a funeral mourning the recent death of the
notorious mafia boss Salvatore “Toto” Riina.106 The doctored picture
included the a caption: “Look who was there to say one last goodbye to Toto
Riina?”107 The photo, shared by a Facebook account with a profile image
which appeared to attribute the post to opposition political party, 5 Star
Movement (Virus5Steelle) is real—taken at a 2016 funeral of a Nigerian
refugee who was murdered. The account was later determined to a fake.108
Without a disinformation policy in place, the Italian government was
dependent on Facebook to police the fake news. “We ask the social
102. Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 556–69 (2011).
103. Id. at 568–69.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Andrés Jiménez, Italy Fights for a Fake News-free Election, MEDIUM (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://medium.com/@BrydenJimenez/italy-fights-for-a-fake-news-free-election-b3cdea1b1952.
107. Paul Harrison, Italy’s Vote: Fake Claims Attempt to Influence Election, BBC NEWS (Mar.
3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43214136.
108. Id.
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networks, and especially Facebook, to help us have a clean electoral
campaign,” said Mr. Renzi.109 Boschi herself took to Facebook to decry the
fake news with the hashtag #nofakenews.110 Following pleas of help from
the Italian government, Facebook announced a fact-checking program
similar to the U.S. program that relies on third-party fact checkers and user
reporting aimed at identifying and debunking false information. The
program works with third-party fact-checking organizations to develop
additional fact-checking reporting which is then posted prominently near the
false story and subsequently demoted on the Facebook algorithm.111 Unlike
the U.S. program, when a user attempts to share the fake news, a notification
alerts them of the disputed content and refers them to additional
information.112 The Italian government has dedicated resources to educate
its citizenry on detecting fake news.113 This situation demonstrates the
vulnerability of the political process to come under attack by unknown
perpetrators and the facility with which Internet media companies can take
reasonable steps to combat fake news.
Italy’s antitrust chief enforcer, Giovanni Pitruzella argued that the
distribution of fake news violates European citizen’s “right to be
pluralistically informed.”114 Moreover, he urged the government to get
involved in verifying information and the removal of “fake news” to avoid
“group polarization.”115 As Justice Kennedy cautioned in United States v.
Alvarez, the government serving as arbiter of what is fake is simply
untenable in the United States as incompatible with the First Amendment.
In his words,
[p]ermitting the government to decree [false] speech to be a
criminal offense . . . would endorse government authority to
compile a list of subjects about which false statements are
punishable. . . . Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea
that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.116
109. Jason Horowitz, Italy, Bracing for Electoral Season of Fake News, Demands Facebook’s
Help, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/world/europe/italyelection-fake-news.html.
110. Jiménez, supra, note 106.
111. Yasmeen Serhan, Italy Scrambles to Fight Misinformation Ahead of Its Elections, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/europefake-news/551972/.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Flemming Rose & Jacob Mchangama, History Proves How Dangerous it is to Have the
Government Regulate Fake News, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:40 PM EDT), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2017/10/03/history-proves-how-dangerous-it-is-tohave-the-government-regulate-fake-news/?utmterm=.09ca37c89516.
115. Id.
116. Alvarez, 67 U.S. at 723.
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Other European countries have taken definitive steps to legislate fake
news. In 2017, the German Bundestag passed the Network Enforcement Act,
an “Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks”
(“NetzDG”), a law that requires Internet media companies with greater than
two million registered users to block and delete illegal content, while
increasing transparency and accountability of platform content removals,
subject to monetary fines up to €5 million for noncompliance.117 Notably,
NetzDG mandates that platforms “remove[] or block[] access to content that
is manifestly unlawful within 24 hours of receiving the complaint.”118
The law has come under fire, in relevant part with respect to “fake
news,” because it provides that “the decision regarding the unlawfulness of
the content is dependent on the falsity,” which is determined by the platforms
themselves.119 Volker Tripp, political director of the non-profit internet
rights organization Digitale Gesellschaft (“digital society”) noted that
“unilaterally shifting this responsibility onto companies is legally
questionable and on top of that not productive.”120 Though Facebook ran
afoul of NetzDG for allegedly underreporting the complaints that the
platform received,121 critics assert that the law incentivizes companies to
“delete in doubt” because it compels decision-making within such a short
time period.122
Internet Media Companies’ Response to Public Regulation
In response to the German law, each of the “Big Three” online media
companies, Google, Facebook, and Twitter, took differing compliance
approaches. Google and Twitter developed an integrated NetzDG flagging
117. Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [NetzDg]
[Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 7, 2017, BUNDESGESETZBLATT Teil I [BGBL I], no. 61 (Ger.),
translated in Aktuelle Gesetzgebungsverfahren, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (July 12, 2017), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfah
ren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Ben Knight, Germany Implements New Internet Hate Speech Crackdown, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Jan. 1 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/germany-implements-new-internet-hate-speechcrackdown/a-41991590.
121. Conference Paper, Ben Wagner et al., Regulating Transparency? Facebook, Twitter and
the German Network Enforcement Act, FAT* ‘20, 8 (Jan. 27–30, 2020), (“[U]ser complaints per
million users listed in NetzDG transparency reports [between 2018 and 2019] are between 7236
and 26215 times higher on Twitter than they are on Facebook.”), https://benwagner.org/wpcontent/plugins/zotpress/lib/request/request.dl.php?api_user_id=2346531&dlkey=ZWMEVW3R
&content_type=application/pdf.
122. Linda Kintstler, Germany’s Attempt to Fix Facebook Is Backfiring, THE ATLANTIC (May
18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/germany-facebook-afd/56
0435/.
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tool whereby users can directly report objectionable content.123 In contrast,
Facebook has embedded its NetzDG complaint form in its Help Center.124
Facebook’s dedicated team first reviews reported content for compliance
with Facebook’s community standards.125 Content found in violation of the
platform’s community standards are removed globally. If the content is
violative of NetzDG but does not run afoul of the community standards, the
content is blocked in Germany and reported. This two-step review process
and the obscured location may be attributable to the relatively lower
reporting rates discussed above.126
Twitter has likewise assembled a compliance team of 50 staff
specifically designed to address NetzDG complaints according to the
NetzDG’s narrower definition of illegal content.127 Elsewhere, content is
first reviewed according to Twitter’s terms and conditions.128 Google’s team
removes most content for violating community guidelines, rather than
NetzDG noting that the two “have a large degree of overlap.”129 While the
platforms handle most takedowns internally, both Facebook and Google
work in collaboration with a voluntary intermediary to review questionable
content within the mandated 7-day timeframe.130

Testing the Regulatory Boundaries of Online Political Speech
in the U.S.
Under the existing jurisprudential framework, the United States
government appears relegated to taking no more than small steps to combat
fake news.131 The United States government frequently requests that Internet
media companies remove content or delete user accounts that the

123. WILLIAM ECHIKSON & OLIVIA KNODT, GERMANY’S NETZDG: A KEY TEST FOR
COMBATTING ONLINE HATE, 1, 7 (CEPS Policy Insight, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300636.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 8.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 10.
130. Id. at 12.
131. First Amendment protections limit the government’s ability to regulate political speech;
however, other federal national security and campaign finance laws compel transparency and
disclosure. See 52 U.S.C. §30121 (2012) (discussing contributions and donations by foreign
nationals); 11 C.F.R. §110.20 (2017) (prohibiting contributions, donations, expenditures,
independent expenditures, and disbursements by foreign nationals).
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government finds problematic.132 Such requests go unanswered.133 A
number of federal legislative proposals have been advanced to update the
government’s toolbox in its battle against “fake news.”
The Honest Ads Act
Spurred in part by allegations of attempted election interference by
Russian nationals, in October 2017, Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN),
Mark Warner (D-VA), and the late Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced
the Honest Ads Act, which would extend existing campaign finance
regulations for broadcast advertising to online platforms.134 The Honest Ads
Act would subject Internet media companies to transparency and recordkeeping requirements.135 The bill stalled; however, it was reintroduced in
May 2019, again with bipartisan co-sponsorship and bolstered by industry
support.136
The Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act
States have also entered the battle to protect the integrity of the nation’s
electoral process. The Maryland law, SB 875, the Online Electioneering
Transparency and Accountability Act, took effect in July 2018. Drawing
from language in the Honest Ads Act, the law extended Maryland’s existing
campaign finance regulation law governing traditional media in two critical
ways with an eye toward the Internet domain. First, the new law added
online advertisements to the record-keeping and disclosure requirements.
Specifically, the record-keeping and disclosure provision required online
platforms to disclose the identity of an ad purchaser, the individuals who
exercise control over the purchaser, and the total amount paid for the ad.
This information was required to be maintained for inspection for up to a
year following an election. Second, the state extended its reach to “online
132. See e.g., Transparency Report: United States of America, TWITTER, https://trans
parency.twitter.com/en/countries/us.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Transparency
Report].
133. Id. (Of the 170 removal requests made on behalf of the U.S. government between January
and June 2019, identifying 732 accounts, Twitter complied with zero requests).
134. The rules, which also banned foreign nationals from paying for ads that mention political
candidates leading up to elections, are outlined in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)
of 2002, also known as McCain-Feingold, which laid out the requirements for “electioneering
communications” in broadcast, cable, and satellite communications. Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
135. Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017). The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA) of 2002, also known as McCain-Feingold, which laid out the requirements for
“electioneering communications” in broadcast, cable, and satellite communications, served as a
blueprint for the bill. The Honest Ads Act also banned foreign nationals from paying for ads that
mention political candidates leading up to elections.
136. Honest Ads Act, S. 1356, 116th Cong. (2019).
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platforms,” defined as “any public facing website . . . including a social
media network or search engine that has 100,000 or more . . . visitors.”137
Publishers, including The Washington Post and The Baltimore Sun,
challenged the new law on First Amendment grounds because the disclosure
requirements compelled the publishers to engage in speech. The Fourth
Circuit sitting en banc affirmed a federal district court’s decision to enjoin
enforcement of the record-keeping and disclosure requirements, raising
several First Amendment grounds: (1) the Act is an impermissible contentbased regulation on speech; (2) “the Act concerns content that is ordinarily
shielded within “the heart of the First Amendment’s protection,”138 and (3)
the Act compels speech. “In sum, it is apparent that Maryland’s law creates
a constitutional infirmity distinct from garden-variety campaign finance
regulations.”139
Notwithstanding the bipartisan support that the Honest Ads Act
garnered and the passage of the state legislation, both efforts are ill-suited to
address “fake news” because their focus on paid advertising overlooks the
volume of Internet-enabled “cheap speech.”140 The economic implications of
potentially anyone disseminating speech “have undermined mediating and
stabilizing institutions of American democracy including newspapers and
political parties, with negative social and political consequences.”141
Proposed Executive Order
The assault on fake news in the United States reached a fever pitch on
May 28, 2020, as President Trump released an Executive Order that takes
aim at the intermediary liability protections that Section 230 extends to
Internet media companies.142 The Executive Order appears to be a reboot of
a 2017 draft that received renewed attention from the administration after
two of the President’s tweets on mail-in voter fraud were flagged as
misleading.143 Striking at the heart of Communications Decency Act,
137. S. 875, 2018 Gen. Assemb., 438th Sess. (Md. 2018) (Online Electioneering Transparency
and Accountability Act).
138. See McManus, 944 F.3d at 514.
139. Id. at 517.
140. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Y ALE L.J. 1805, 1807
(1995).
141. Symposium, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 200, 201 (2017).
142. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079 (May 28, 2020).
143. The 2020 Executive Order follows a 2017 draft Executive Order which arose from
concerns of political bias and is supported by a purported 15,000 anecdotal complaints of political
censorship on social media platforms. However, accusations of political bias remain unproven.
See Shiva Stella, Public Knowledge Responds to White House Proposal to Require FTC, FCC to
Monitor Speech on Social Media, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.public
knowledge.org/press-release/public-knowledge-responds-to-white-house-proposal-to-require-ftcfcc-to-monitor-speech-on-social-media/; Casey Newton, Why Twitter Labeling Trump’s Tweets As

2021

COMBATING FAKE NEWS

103

Section 230, the Executive Order calls for government review of Internet
media companies’ content moderation practices, declaring that “[w]e must
seek transparency and accountability from online platforms, and encourage
standards and tools to protect and preserve the integrity and openness of
American discourse and freedom of expression.”144
The Executive Order, “Preventing Online Censorship,” addresses
perceived bias by Internet media companies in moderating political
speech.145 The White House seeks to curtail the good-faith provision of the
Communications Decency Act by imposing additional obligations on
Internet media companies seeking liability protections.146 Specifically, the
Executive Order attempts to tie the “good faith” liability shield in Section
230(c)(2), which immunizes platforms from liability arising from “any
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene . . . or otherwise
objectionable,” to the protections in Section 230(c)(1), which protects
platforms from being treated as speakers. The Executive Order invokes
sweeping government action to regulate Internet media companies. Among
other actions, the order directs the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration to file a petition for rulemaking with the Federal
Communications Commission to “propose regulations to clarify” the scope
of Section 230, directs the Federal Trade Commission to report on
complaints of political bias, instructs the Department of Justice to investigate
allegations of anti-conservative bias, and prevents federal agencies from
advertising on platforms that allegedly violate Section 230’s good faith
principles. Notwithstanding the jurisdictional and constitutional concerns
that it raises, the Executive Order demonstrates a political openness to
stipulate safe harbors for Internet media companies to retain liability
protection.147

Proposed Model: Coordinated Regulation through
“Reasonable Standards”
The growing political will in both the legislative and executive branches
to revisit the regulation of Internet media companies represents a moment to
exercise reasonableness in addressing the 26 words that created the Internet.
“Potentially Misleading” Is a Big Step Forward, THE VERGE: THE INTERFACE (May 27, 2020,
5:01 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/5/27/21270556/trump-twitter-label-mis
leading-tweets.
144. Executive Order, supra, note 142.
145. See Brian Fung et al., Trump Signs Executive Order Targeting Social Media Companies,
CNN POLITICS (May 28, 2020, 9:22 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/politics/trumptwitter-social-media-executive-order/index.html.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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A coordinated regulatory approach would capitalize on the strengths and
virtues of industry self-regulation, while accounting for its weaknesses as a
self-interested body.
Professors Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes advance a proposition
that conditions immunity not on a platform’s content moderation, but rather
on the platform’s design choices. This “precision regulation” approach
would strip immunity for Internet media companies whose “design choices
[ ]amounted to a failure to take reasonable steps to prevent or address
unlawful uses of its services.”148 What is more, observers have noted that
the harms resulting from “fake news” are less about what is shared, rather
than how it is shared.149 After all, the Internet has revolutionized the speed
and volume with which fake news is propagated. What users see is
determined entirely by the algorithms deployed by Internet media companies
that rank and prioritize content. “They design and predict nearly everything
that happens on their site, from the moment a user signs in to the moment
she logs out.”150
The proposed amendment to Section 230(c)(1) reads, in relevant part,
that
[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service that takes
reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of its services
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider in any action
arising out of the publication of content provided by that
information content provider.151
Under this conceptualization, adopting a reasonable standard of care
replaces the broad immunity currently enjoyed with an affirmative defense
against liability claims. As Citron notes, the reasonable standard would
examine whether the company employed reasonable content management
practices writ-large, rather than with respect to a particular use of the service.
As such, the reasonableness standard offers flexibility to evolve as the
existent technology does.

148. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans Sec. 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 417 (2017). Consider Former FCC
Commissioner Tom Wheeler’s proposition that “public interest algorithms” can be among Internet
media platform’s consumer protection toolkit. See Tom Wheeler, “Using ‘Public Interest
Algorithms’ to Tackle the Problems Created by Social Media Algorithms,” BROOKINGS:
TECHTANK, (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/11/01/using-publicinterest-algorithms-to-tackle-the-problems-created-by-social-media-algorithms/.
149. See e.g., The Information Society Project, supra note 5 at 5.
150. Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTE (Apr. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data.
151. Citron, supra, note 147 at 419.
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Some have balked at reforming Section 230, warning that it would stifle
innovation and end the Internet as we know it. 152 Critics are also wont to
cite Congress’ desire to “encourage the unfettered and unregulated
development of free speech on the Internet.”153 However, these arguments
are tenuous when considered in light of another regulatory framework
crafted precisely for the Internet age—the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”).154
Internet media companies are already “quite good at complying with at
least one government regulation.”155 The DMCA has, as intended, mobilized
platforms to control individual users. Remarkably, “[t]he existence of the
legal scheme set forth in the DMCA demonstrates that the CDA’s policy of
conferring complete immunity on ISPs is not inevitable and, most
significantly, not currently understood as a First Amendment
requirement.”156 In the estimation of communications professors Nina
Brown and Jonathan Peters, “[i]f there were any existing, workable model
for Congress to use to regulate fake news on social media, this would be
it.”157
Like Section 230, the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA shield online
service providers from claims—in this instance copyright infringement
claims—arising from third-parties. Section 512 of the DMCA states that a
service provider must adopt and reasonably implement a policy as a
condition of eligibility for safe harbor protection.158
Consider a recent lawsuit wherein an Internet media company invoked
Section 230 in light of the proposed reasonable steps approach. While the
matter did not involve fake news, the analysis provides a basis for
consideration. Section 230 doctrine insulated Grindr, an online dating
platform, in a lawsuit alleging that the platform’s negligent design of its
dating app enabled a campaign of harassment resulting from a user’s ability
to impersonate another.159 Specifically, the amended complaint alleged that
the site, whose terms of service prohibit the use of its product to impersonate,
152. See e.g., Andy Kessler, Kill Section 230, You Kill the Internet, WALL ST. J. (June 30,
2019 3:56 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kill-section-230-you-kill-the-internet-11561
924578.
153. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003).
154. Citron, supra note 12.
155. BROWN, supra note 16, at 530 (discussing the notice and takedown provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)).
156. Tushnet, supra note 41, at 1004. Professor Citron has noted that the critique that
Congress intended to encourage free speech on the Internet is divorced from the legislative history.
See CDA 230: Legislative History, Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org/
issues/cda230/legislative-history (last visited Apr. 29, 2020).
157. Brown, supra note 16, at 531 note 72 (noting that DMCA § 512 has been used as a
suggested framework for legislation in the instances of regulating revenge pornography and
defamation).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018).
159. Herrick v. Grindr, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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stalk, harass, or threaten, did nothing to respond to the plaintiff’s
complaints.160 Moreover, the complaint alleged a number of design
decisions that, if reasonably undertaken, would have prevented or mitigated
the harm.161 There, a court may be unlikely to grant a motion to dismiss on
Section 230 grounds under the proposed amendment, reasoning that the site
lacked a reasonable process to monitor its terms of service writ large rather
than because the site moderators failed to respond responsibly in the
Plaintiff’s case.
With respect to moderating fake news, an Internet media company
could avail itself of Section 230 safe harbors if it employed reasonable steps
to monitor, identify, and remove content that did not accord with its
community standards and terms of service. An argument could be made that
content moderation decisions including algorithm-enabled ranking may be
similar to a publisher’s editorial choices and may deserve First Amendment
protection. Thus, the validity of this regulation would involve discerning
whether the algorithms that the Internet media companies deploy are due
First Amendment rights as a type of speech.
Amending Section 230 will likely raise concerns about censorship.
Those concerns, however, may be overblown in light of online media
companies’ conduct in compliance with German regulation discussed above.
Moreover, the amendment’s effect of compelling platforms to adopt
reasonable standards in order to retain immunity would not come to bear on
any particular element of speech.
To the extent that the proposed amendment is resisted on the grounds
that it contravenes the legislative intent to leave the Internet unregulated, this
Article offers the proposition that “[t]he Internet is no longer a fragile new
means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by
overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-andmortar businesses. Rather, it has become a dominant-perhaps the
preeminent-means through which commerce is conducted.”162
Lawrence Lessig reminds us that “[h]ow the code regulates . . . [is a]
question[] that any practice of justice must focus [on] in the age of
cyberspace.”163 Platforms control what content appears on their services
through their design choices and speech policies.164 Thus, it is in this
currently unregulated space that Congress is afforded perhaps the most

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008).
163. Id.; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Note, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554-56 (1998) (exploring how system
design choices provide sources of rulemaking and make a “useful extra-legal instrument that may
be used to achieve objectives that otherwise challenge conventional laws”).
164. See Citron, supra note 12.
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appropriate opportunity to affect behavioral change while maintaining the
integrity of Section 230.165
Conclusion
Fake news presents an ever-growing problem around the globe. The
First Amendment’s free speech protections and the Communications
Decency Act curtail any government regulation on speech. However, that
does not leave the area without regulation. The private sector needs
regulatory support to bolster its efforts to find fake news and identify it for
users. This can be achieved through an amendment to Section 230 that
conditions immunity on compliance with technical reasonable standards to
address fake news. The recommendation of the adoption of the “reasonable
standards” approach advanced herein is a modest extension of current
jurisprudence and would provide a balanced approach to regulating online
political speech, so as to not curb free expression or censor content.

165.

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 61 (2006).

5/26/21

108

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

***

43:1

